Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory by Shech, Elay
	 1	
Historical	Inductions	Meet	the	Material	Theory	by	Elay	Shech	Oct.	2018	(Pre-conference	version)		Forthcoming	in	Philosophy	of	Science		
Acknowledgements:	I	am	indebted	to	John	Norton	and	Moti	Mizrahi	for	extremely	valuable	discussion	and	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	this	paper.	Thank	you	also	to	helpful	conversation	with	the	audience	at	the	Auburn	University	Philosophical	Society	in	the	Spring	of	2018	and	participants	in	Gila	Sher’s	Truth	and	Scientific	
Change	reading	group	in	the	Fall	of	2017	at	the	Sidney	M.	Edelstein	Center	for	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science,	Technology	and	Medicine	at	the	Hebrew	University	of	Jerusalem.		
Abstract:	Historical	inductions,	viz.,	the	pessimistic	meta-induction	and	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives,	are	critically	analyzed	via	John	D.	Norton’s	material	theory	of	induction	and	subsequently	rejected	as	non-cogent	arguments.	It	is	suggested	that	the	material	theory	is	amenable	to	a	local	version	of	the	pessimistic	meta-induction,	e.g.,	in	the	context	of	some	medical	studies.		1.	Introduction		My	goal	is	to	contribute	to	a	growing	literature	that	is	critical	of	historical	inductions	such	as	the	pessimistic	(meta-)induction	(PMI)	argument	(Poincaré	1952,	160;	Putnam	1978,	25;	Laudan	1981)	and	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives	(Stanford	2001,	2006)	against	scientific	realism,	concentrating	mostly	on	the	former.		The	PMI	can	be	construed	in	different	ways	(Mizrahi	2015,	Wray	2015),	viz.,	as	a	deductive	reductio	ad	absurdum	(e.g.,	Psillos	1996,	1999),	a	counterexample	to	the	no	miracles	argument	and	inference	to	best	explanation	argument	for	scientific	realism	(e.g.,	Saatsi	2005,	Laudan	1981),	or,	usually,	as	an	inductive	argument	(e.g.,	Poincaré	1952,	Putnam	1978,	Laudan	1981,	Rescher	1987).	In	the	following	I	will	argue	against	the	inductive	version	of	PMI—or	any	construal	of	the	PMI	that	makes	use	of	historical	induction—using	John	D.	Norton’s	material	theory	of	induction	(Norton	2003,	Manuscript).	The	upshot	is	that	one	ought	to	be	critical	of	historical	inductions	that	seem	to	fit	the	general	form	or	pattern	of	a	good	inductive	argument,	but	may	in	fact	lack	inductive	warrant	and	force.	Various	critiques	have	been	put	against	the	PMI	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Lewis	2001,	Mizrahi	2013),	along	with	some	defenses	(e.g.,	Saatsi	2005).	In	Section	2	I	will	present	the	PMI	and	briefly	discuss	some	criticism	in	order	to	place	my	own	analysis	in	broader	context.	Section	3	presents	the	material	theory	of	induction	and	argues	that	it	dissolves	the	PMI,	while	Section	4	extends	such	claims	to	the	more	recent	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives.	In	Section	5	I	note	that	the	material	theory	of	induction	does	leave	room	for	a	local	version	of	the	PMI,	which	holds	in	some	
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limited	domain,	such	as	in	relation	to	certain	medical	studies	(Ruhmkorff	2014).	I	end	in	Section	6	with	a	short	conclusion.		2.	The	(Inductive)	Pessimistic	(Meta-)Induction			The	modern	formulation	of	the	PMI	is	usually	attributed	to	Laudan	(1981)	who	argued	that	having	genuinely	referential	theoretical	and	observational	terms,	or	being	approximately	true,	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	a	theory	being	explanatory	and	predictively	successful.	More	generally,	Anjan	Chakravartty	characterizes	the	argument	as	follows:		 [PMI	can]	be	described	as	a	two-step	worry.	First,	there	is	an	assertion	to	the	effect	that	the	history	of	science	contains	an	impressive	graveyard	of	theories	that	were	previously	believed	[to	be	true],	but	subsequently	judged	to	be	false	.	.	.	Second,	there	is	an	induction	on	the	basis	of	this	assertion,	whose	conclusion	is	that	current	theories	are	likely	future	occupants	of	the	same	graveyard.	(Chakravartty	2008,	152)1		The	PMI	then	may	take	the	following	form:		
[Inductive	Generalization	PMI]	
	P(i)	Past	theory	1	was	successful	but	not	genuinely	referential	or	approximately	true.	P(ii)	Past	theory	2	was	successful	but	not	genuinely	referential	or	approximately	true.	…	C)	Therefore,	current	(and	perhaps	future)	theories	are	successful	but	(by	induction)	probably	not	genuinely	referential	or	approximately	true.		 Laudan	(1981)	suggests	that	the	history	of	science	contains	a	graveyard	of	theories	that	were	previously	believed	to	be	approximately	true	and	genuinely	referential,	but	that	subsequently	were	judged	to	be	false	and	not	to	refer.	Estimations	of	the	number	of	such	superseded	theories	have	been	debated	(e.g.,	Lewis	2001,	Wray	2013)	and	recently	Mizrahi	(2016)	presents	evidence	that	challenges	the	“history	of	science	as	a	graveyard	of	theories”	claim.	Others	voice	concerns	regarding	the	period	of	history	of	science	used	in	order	to	extract	historical	evidence	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Fahrbach	2011)	or	the	proper	unit	of	analysis,	i.e.,	theories	vs.	theoretical	entity	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Magnus	and	Callender	2004).		Similarly,	Park	(2011,	83)	and	Mizrahi	(2013,	3220-3222)	have	argued	that	the	PMI	is	fallacious	due	to	cherry-picking	data,	biased	statistics,	and	non-random	sampling.	My	own	criticism	of	the	inductive	PMI	comes	from	a	different	avenue.	I	will	assume	that	the	anti-realist	does	have	randomly	sampled	historical	evidence	from	the	correct	period	of	history	and	with	the	proper	unit	of	analysis	(whatever	those																																																									1	cf.	Wray	(2015,	61).	
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may	be)	that	is	not	biased	or	cherry-picked.	Still,	on	the	material	theory	of	induction	the	PMI	will	not	be	a	cogent	argument.	In	other	words,	I	aim	to	identify	what	I	take	to	be	a	more	fundamental	(although	not	categorically	different)	problem	with	the	PMI.		3.	PMI	Meets	the	Material	Theory		3.1	The	Material	Theory	of	Induction	in	a	Nutshell		Consider	the	following	formally	identical	inductive	inferences	(Norton	2003,	649):		 P1)	Some	samples	of	the	element	bismuth	melt	at	271	degrees	C.	C1)	Therefore,	all	samples	of	the	element	bismuth	melt	at	271	degrees	C.		P2)	Some	samples	of	wax	melt	at	91	degrees	C.	C2)	Therefore,	all	samples	of	wax	melt	at	91	degrees	C.		What	makes	the	first	argument	an	inductively	strong	and	cogent	argument	while	the	second	a	weak	and	non-cogent	inductive	argument?	Norton	(2003,	Manuscript)	has	argued	that	formal	theories	of	induction,	which	provide	universal	schemas	that	are	meant	to	identify	the	inductions	that	are	licit	and	those	that	are	not,	stand	against	an	insurmountable	difficulty	when	facing	such	a	question.2	Instead,	he	offers	a	material	account	of	induction:		 In	a	material	theory,	the	admissibility	of	an	induction	is	ultimately	traced	back	to	a	matter	of	fact,	not	to	a	universal	schema.	We	are	licensed	to	infer	from	the	melting	point	of	some	samples	of	an	element	to	the	melting	point	of	all	samples	by	a	fact	about	elements:	their	samples	are	generally	uniform	in	their	physical	properties.	…	All	inductions	ultimately	derive	their	licenses	
from	facts	pertinent	to	the	matter	of	the	induction.	(Norton	2003,	650;	original	emphasis)		Norton	calls	the	local	facts	that	power	inductive	inferences	“material	postulates.”	Material	postulates	themselves	are	supported	by	other	instances	of	induction	that	are	licensed	by	different	material	postulates.		3.2	Material	Analysis	of	PMI		Many	of	the	criticism	of	the	inductive	PMI	discussed	above	amount	to	the	claim	that	the	universal	schema	used	by	the	likes	of	Laudan	(1981),	namely,	(P3)	Some	A’s	are	B’s,	(C3)	Therefore,	all	A’s	are	B’s,	does	not	apply	in	the	case	of	the	PMI	because	various	criteria	needed	to	implement	the	scheme,	e.g.,	random	sampling,	correct	historical	period,	proper	unit	of	analysis,	have	not	been	met.	What	I	wish	to	do	here																																																									2	I	will	not	defend	Norton’s	theory	or	claims	here.	He	dedicates	an	entire	book	to	the	matter	in	Norton	(Manuscript).	
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is	conduct	a	material	analysis	of	the	PMI.	Considering	the	above	presentation	of	the	PMI	in	its	[Inductive	Generalization	PMI]	form	we	may	ask,	what	powers	the	inductive	inference,	i.e.,	what	material	postulate	licenses	the	pessimistic	conclusion?	In	context	of	the	two	inductive	arguments	considered	in	Section	3.1,	we	note	that	there	is	no	material	postulate	that	licenses	the	inductive	inference	in	the	case	of	wax	(P2	too	C2)	but	there	is	one	in	the	case	of	bismuth	(P1	to	C1):	Generally,	chemical	elements	are	uniform	in	their	physical	properties.	By	analogy,	the	presumption	of	the	meta-induction	is	that	each	historical	case	study	looked	at	is	an	instance	of	the	same	thing,	a	discovery	of	induction	in	science.	If	we	are	to	perform	the	meta-induction	then	there	needs	to	be	something	in	the	background	facts	that	unifies	all	such	inductions,	just	like	the	fact	chemical	elements	are	generally	uniform	in	their	physical	properties	warrants	the	inductive	inference	regarding	the	melting	point	of	bismuth.	Let	us	consider	several	options.	First,	perhaps	the	material	fact	is	that	most	scientists	use	a	common	rule	or	method	in	constructing	or	discovering	successful	theories,	something	along	the	lines	of	Mill’s	methods	of	experimental	inquiry	in	his	System of Logic (1872, Book III, Ch. 
7).	If	so,	the	properties	of	the	rule	would	be	used	to	authorize	the	induction.	Is	there	such	a	rule,	or	perhaps,	some	common	scientific	method?	A	glance	at	the	history	of	science	suggests	that	this	is	unlikely.	Newton’s	deduction	from	the	phenomena,	is	very	different	from	Darwin’s	inference	to	best	explanation,	which	in	turn	differs	radically	from	Einstein’s	thought	experiments	with	lights	beams,	trains,	and	elevators.3	More	generally,	there	seems	to	be	a	consensus	among	historians	and	philosophers	of	science	that	something	like	“the	scientific	method”	is	really	more	of	an	umbrella	term	for	very	different	methods	used	by	scientists	to	construct	and	discover	theories.	After	all,	novel	problems	necessitate	novels	solutions,	and	the	commonality	that	does	arise	in	different	cases,	say,	attempts	to	minimize	error	or	to	be	objective,	is	not	the	kind	of	commonality	that	we	seek	in	powering	the	PMI	and	drawing	the	pessimistic	conclusion.	For	instance,	in	his	book	Styles	of	Knowing:	A	
New	History	of	Science	from	Ancient	Times	to	the	Present,	Chungling	Kwa	(2011)	argues	that	there	is	no	single,	fundamental	method	used	in	science:	“there	is	not	just	one	form	of	Western	scientific	rationality;	there	are	at	least	six.”	The	framework	of	six	“styles	of	knowing,”	includes	the	deductive,	the	experimental,	the	hypothetical-analogical,	the	taxonomic,	the	statistical,	and	the	evolutionary	style,	and	is	based	on	Alistair	Crombie’s	(1994)	three-volume	work	Styles	of	Scientific	Thinking.	Similar,	Ian	Hacking	(also	taking	lead	from	Crombie’s	work)	has	argued	that	there	are	distinct	“styles	of	reasoning”	used	in	science,	such	as	the	postulational	style,	the	style	of	experimental	exploration,	the	style	of	hypothetical	construction	of	models	by	analogy,	the	taxonomic	style,	the	statistical	style,	the	historical	derivation	of	genetic	development,	and	the	laboratory	style	(Hacking	1992).	This	further																																																									3	In	fact,	see	Norton	(Manuscript,	Ch.	8-9)	who	argues	that	even	in	historical	cases	where	the	same	principle	is	applied	by	scientists,	viz.,	inference	to	best	explanation,	“at	best	we	can	find	loose	similarities	that	the	canonical	examples	of	inference	to	best	explanation	share,”	so	that	no	common	rule	of	the	kind	needed	to	power	the	PMI	can	be	found	(Ch.	8,	p.	1).	
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corroborates	the	idea	that	scientific	methods	used	for	theory	construction	and	discovery,	as	well	as	for	scientific	explanation,	are	very	diverse.	More	generally,	scientific	theories	are	not	kind	of	things	that	portray	the	type	of	uniformity	needed	to	license	inductive	inferences	on	Norton’s	material	theory.	Albeit	in	a	different	context,	a	similar	point	is	nicely	made	by	Mizrahi	(2013,	3218):		A	uniform—as	opposed	to	diverse—sample	might	be	a	sample	of,	say,	copper	rods.	From	a	sample	of	just	a	few	copper	rods	that	are	tested	for	electrical	conductivity,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	all	copper	rods	conduct	electricity	because,	if	you	have	seen	one	or	two	copper	rods,	you	have	seen	them	all	(given	their	uniform	atomic	structure).	Scientific	theories,	however,	are	not	as	uniform	as	copper	rods.	The	point,	then,	is	that	any	sample	of	theories	is	not	going	to	be	uniform	in	a	way	that	is	required	for	a	“seen	one,	seen	them	all”	inductive	generalization.			 Similarly,	and	second,	perhaps	there	are	some	facts	about	investigating	scientist	themselves,	how	they	work,	and/or	the	problems	situations	that	they	work	in,	which	can	unify	the	historical	evidence	in	a	way	that	provides	us	with	the	inductive	warrant	we	seek.	Maybe	such	facts	will	include	something	about	the	psychology	of	scientists:	their	fastidiousness	and	fear	of	error,	their	facility	at	jumping	to	conclusions,	or	perhaps	their	curiosity,	logic,	creativity,	skepticism,	etc.	However,	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	search	for	a	common	rule	used	in	constructing	successful	theories,	the	history	of	science	furnishes	us	with	scientists	that	are	heterogeneous	enough	in	their	psychological	traits,	and	work	in	such	varied	contexts,	so	as	not	to	provide	us	with	any	was	to	unify	the	various	historical	cases	in	a	way	pertinent	to	licensing	the	pessimistic	inference	of	the	PMI.		 Third,	perhaps	we	can	circumvent	looking	to	a	common	rule	of	constructing	or	discovering	theories,	or	searching	for	common	traits	among	scientists,	by	noting	that	the	follow	candidate	material	postulate	would	power	the	PMI:			 MP-PMI:	Generally,	successful	theories	are	not	genuinely	referential	and/or	approximately	true.			But	how	would	we	establish	MP-PMI?	One	option	is	to	appeal	to	the	PMI	itself,	but	this	would	either	be	circular	or	else	push	us	to	look	for	another	material	postulate.	Another	option	is	just	to	grant	the	MP-PMI	as	a	reasonable	assumption.	Perhaps	anti-realists	or	instrumentalists	would	think	that	this	is	a	sensible	starting	point,	but	their	target	realist	opponent	would	surely	reject	such	an	assumption	as	question	begging.	Last,	perchance	there	is	some	fact	about	explanatory	and/or	predictively	successful	theories	that	renders	them,	generally,	not	genuinely	referential	and/or	approximately	true?	Possibly	part	of	the	essence	of	successful	theories	is	to	misrepresent	the	world?	To	me	this	seems	highly	unlikely	and	at	odds	with	any	levelheaded	intuition	but,	in	any	case,	if	we	could	argue	that	successful	theories	are	essentially	inaccurate	then	we	would	not	need	the	PMI	in	the	first	place!	
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	 Fourth,	we	may	want	to	construe	the	PMI	in	its	inductive	generalization	form	as	a	kind	of	abductive	argument	with	the	following	type	of	material	postulate:4		
[Inductive	Generalization	PMI	–	Abductive	version]		P(i):	The	success	of	past	theory	1	(constructed	using	method	m)	is	not	best	explained	by	its	truth.		P(ii):	The	success	of	past	theory	2	(constructed	using	method	m)	is	not	best	explained	by	its	truth.		…	MP:	Scientific	theories	constructed	using	method	m	are	generally	uniform	with	respect	to	what	best	explains	their	predictive	success.		C:	The	success	of	our	best	current	(and	perhaps	futures)	theories	(constructed	using	method	m)	are	not	best	explained	by	their	truth.		Stating	the	PMI	as	above	has	the	merit	of	directly	engaging	with	the	“no	miracles	argument”	for	scientific	realism,	namely:		 That	terms	in	mature	scientific	theories	typically	refer	[to	things	in	the	world]	…,	that	theories	accepted	in	a	mature	science	are	typically	approximately	true,	that	the	same	term	can	refer	to	the	same	thing	even	when	it	occurs	in	different	theories―these	statements	are	viewed	by	the	scientific	realist	not	as	necessary	truths	but	as	part	of	the	only	scientific	explanation	of	the	success	of	science,	and	hence	as	part	of	any	adequate	scientific	description	of	science	and	its	relations	to	its	objects.	(Putnam	1975,	73)		But	worries	abound.	First,	the	realist	may	very	well	deny	P(i),	P(ii),	etc.,	and	argue	that	the	success	of	past	theories	is	best	explained	by	their	truth	but	that,	as	it	turns	out,	either	the	best	explanation	did	not	hold	in	this	case	or	else	there	is	some	sense	in	which	past	theories,	insofar	as	they	were	successful,	were	approximately	true	or	on	the	road	to	truth.	Second,	construing	the	argument	as	an	abduction	opens	up	a	Pandora’s	box	of	problems	associated	with	the	notion	of	explanation:	What	is	explanation?	Are	there	accounts	of	explanation	where	success	is	best	explained	by	truth	and	ones	in	which	it	isn’t	and,	if	so,	which	account	of	explanation	is	relevant	in	this	context?	And	so	on.		Third,	the	cogency	of	the	argument	depends	on	the	idea	that	all	theories	appealed	to	were	constructed	with	some	method	m,	but	we	already	judged	that	there	is	no	one	method	that	is	relevant	to	constructing	scientific	theories.	Perhaps	phenomenological	models	are	good	candidates	for	the	type	of	things	that	can	provide	empirical	success	but	are	not	generally	approximately	true.5	Thus,	at	best,	the	above	argument	can	power	a	kind	of	local	PMI:	Successful	theories	constructed																																																									4	Thanks	to	Tim	Sundell	for	suggest	this	line	of	thought.	5	Phenomenological	models	are,	generally,	not	considered	explanatory.	
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by	method	m	are	not	approximately	true.	We’ll	consider	one	such	case	in	more	detail	in	Section	5.	In	short,	on	the	material	theory	of	induction	inductive	arguments	are	powered	by	facts,	by	material	postulates,	but	in	the	context	of	the	PMI	it	seems	unlikely	that	any	such	non-question	begging	postulates,	which	wouldn’t	render	the	PMI	obsolete,	can	be	found.	This	is	so	even	if,	say,	the	historical	data	was	not	cherry-picked,	and	the	right	unit	of	analysis	and	correct	period	of	history	were	used.	In	other	words,	I’m	equally	skeptic	of	projects	that	attempt	to	block	the	pessimistic	conclusion	by,	for	example,	taking	a	random	sample	of	past	scientific	theories,	e.g.,	Mizrahi	(2016).	In	the	following	section	I’ll	attempt	to	extend	such	claims	to	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives.		4.	Extension	to	the	Problem	of	Unconceived	Alternatives		Recently,	P.	Kyle	Stanford	(2001,	2006)	has	developed	what	may	be	characterized	as	a	new	version	of	the	PMI:		 …	I	propose	the	following	New	Induction	over	the	History	of	Science:	that	we	have,	throughout	the	history	of	scientific	inquiry	and	in	virtually	every	field,	repeatedly	occupied	an	epistemic	position	in	which	we	could	conceive	of	only	one	or	a	few	theories	that	were	well-confirmed	by	the	available	evidence,	while	subsequent	history	of	inquiry	has	routinely	(if	not	invariably)	revealed	further,	radically	distinct	alternatives	as	well-confirmed	by	the	previously	available	evidence	as	those	we	were	inclined	to	accept	on	the	strength	of	that	evidence.	(Stanford	2001,	S8-S9)		The	problem	of	unconceinved	alternatives	as	an	argument	against	scientific	realism	has	been	criticized	on	various	grounds	(e.g.,	Chakravartty	2008,	Devitt	2011,	Mizrahi	2015),	but	my	goal	here	is	just	to	note	that	the	discussion	of	Section	3	can	be	extended	to	this	new	version	of	the	PMI,	which	can	be	construed	as	follows:		 P(i)	In	the	past	time	of	theory	1,	theory	1	was	successful	but	there	were	unconceived	alternative	theories	that	were	as	well	supported	by	available	evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.	P(ii)	In	the	past	time	of	theory	2,	theory	2	was	successful	but	there	were	unconceived	alternative	theories	that	were	as	well	supported	by	available	evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.	…	C)	Therefore,	in	present	times,	current	theories	are	successful	but	(by	induction)	there	probably	are	unconceived	alternative	theories	that	are	as	well	supported	by	available	evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.		What	we	need	for	the	material	analysis	is	something	like:	Generally,	successful	theories	are	underdetermined	by	data	due	to	possible	unconceived	alternative	theories.	In	a	similar	fashion	to	the	MP-PMI,	we	could	look	to	some	common	rule	used	by	scientists	to	conceive	theories,	or	some	common	psychological	traits	among	
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scientist,	that	may	ground	the	idea	that	successful	theories	are	such	that	empirically	adequate	unconceived	alternatives	always	exists.	But	for	the	same	reasons	discussed	above,	it	seems	unlikely	that	any	such	common	rule	or	traits	will	be	found.	That	said,	perhaps	cognitive	facts	about	human	scientists	might	support	the	inductive	inference	to	the	conclusion	that	we	always	miss	some	alternative	theories,	which	in	turn	are	consistent	with	the	available	evidence.	What	is	attractive	about	this	line	of	thought	is	that	it	does	seem	plausible	that	due	to	our	cognitive	limitations	there	are	always	“unconceived	alternatives.”	However,	mere	cognitive	limitations	do	not	support	the	further	conclusion	that	there	are	unconcieved	alternative	theories	that	are	consistent	with	available	evidence.		 Alternatively,	one	may	think	that	Stanford’s	new	induction	circumvents	the	material	objection:	modal	reflections	alone	convince	us	that	there	are	always	unconceived	alternative	theories	that	can	explain	and	predict	empirical	phenomena	just	as	well	or	better	than	conceived	theories.	But	how	can	we	come	to	such	a	conclusion	based	on	modal	reflections	alone?	Isn’t	it	conceivable	if	not	possible	that	there	would	be	a	point	in	history	with	no	unconceived	alternatives	and	isn’t	conceivable	if	not	possible	that	we	are	at	such	point	in	time	in	history?	Moreover,	it	is	unclear	what	to	make	of	theory-independent	modal	claims	(unless	one	has	logical	modality	in	mind,	which	isn’t	the	case	here).	Certainly,	we	can	talk	about	different	physically	possible	worlds	given	a	particular	physical	theory.	For	instance,	various	solutions	to	the	Einstein	field	equations	are	taken	to	denote	different	possible	universes	according	to	relativity	theory.	But	it	isn’t	clear	what	is	meant	by	different	possible	or	alternative	conceivable	theories	given	no	meta-theory	as	a	constraint,	so	to	speak.6	In	any	case,	if	we	know	that	unconceived	alternative	theories	always	exist	based	on	modal	reflections	alone,	then	the	historical	induction	is	doing	no	work	for	us	at	all.		5.	Room	for	a	local,	material	pessimistic	induction?		Although	the	material	analysis	given	here	may	prompt	us	to	be	skeptical	of	historical	inductions	(insofar	as	one	is	moved	by	the	material	theory	of	induction),	it	can	help	us	understand	why	local	pessimistic	inductions	may	be	tenable.	Specifically,	I	want	to	look	at	a	recent	discussion	by	Rumkorf	(2014)	who	contends	that	meta-analyses	in	medicine	such	as	Ioannidis’	(2005a,	2005b),	which	show	that	a	disconcertingly	high	percentage	of	prominent	medical	research	findings	are	refuted	by	subsequent	research,	can	be	developed	into	a	local	pessimistic	induction.	Ioannidis	(2005a,	2005b)	is	concerned	with	studies,	denoted	“M-studies,”	that	satisfy	the	following	criteria:	“being	highly	cited,	using	contemporary	research	and	statistical	methods,	and	being	among	the	first	studies	to	investigate	a	question	at	issue”	(Rumkorf	2014,	420).	Rumkorf’s	(2014,	421)	then	uses	the	various	conclusions	of	Ioannidis	(2005a,	2005b)	to	generate	a	local	PMI	in	the	field	of	medicine	(PMI-M):																																																										6	What	would	count	as	a	(logically	possible	but	physically)	impossible	theory	in	such	a	context?	
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E1	41%	of	the	associative	or	causal	claims	made	by	M-studies	in	the	sample	were	inconsistent	with	the	results	of	subsequent	published	studies	either	(1)	because	the	later	studies	provided	evidence	against	the	existence	of	the	association	or	effect;	or	(2)	because	the	later	studies	provided	evidence	that	the	magnitude	of	the	association	or	effect	was	significantly	different.		E2	Therefore,	we	can	expect	approximately	41%	of	the	associative	and	causal	claims	made	by	M-studies	to	be	inconsistent	with	subsequent	published	studies.		On	Norton’s	theory	we	need	to	appeal	to	a	material	postulate	to	license	the	pessimistic	inductive	inference	in	the	transitions	from	E1	to	E2,	but	since	we	are	now	working	in	a	limited	domain	without	many	heterogeneous	examples	as	in	the	whole	history	of	science,	we	may	now	find	some	significant	commonality	between	the	methods	used	in	different	M-studies	that	can	act	as	licensing	facts.	What	are	the	background	facts	that	power	the	PMI-M?	Here	are	some	options	extracted	from	Ioannidis’s	diagnosis	of	his	meta-analysis	and	quoted	in	Ruhmkorf	(2014,	219):		 Contributing	factors	include:	bias	in	research	(Ioannidis	2005b);	non-randomized	trials	(Ioannidis	2005a);	smaller	rather	than	larger	sample	sizes	in	refuted	studies	(Ioannidis	2005a,	224);	and	publication	and	time-lag	biases	(whereby	studies	with	highly	significant	and	potentially	aberrational	positive	results	are	overrepresented	among	published	articles	in	major	journals	and	are	published	more	quickly	than	other	articles)	(Ioannidis	2005a,	224).	Particularly	intriguing	is	the	idea	that	large-scale	features	of	the	structure	of	medical	and	biological	inquiry	contribute	to	the	high	contradiction	rate.	Having	a	number	of	distinct	working	groups	looking	at	the	same	problem	increases	the	chances	that	at	least	one	of	them	will	find	something	statistically	significant,	especially	if	they	are	looking	at	a	wide	array	of	possible	relationships	(Ioannidis	2005b,	697–698).	The	computational	power	and	richness	of	data	sets	available	to	researchers	increases	the	chance	that	some	of	them	will	be	successful	in	achieving	statistical	significance,	even	when	no	real	relationship	exists	(Ioannidis	2005b,	701).7		These	various	factors,	insofar	as	they	are	common	to	most	M-studies,	are	the	type	of	background	facts	that	warrant	the	pessimistic	induction	from	a	material	point	of	view.	One	may	worry	of	course	that	the	pessimism	associated	with	local	PMI	generalizes	since,	presumably,	facts	about	biases	and	the	like	are	facts	about	researchers	in	general,	not	just	researchers	in	medical	science	in	particular.	But,	although	all	scientific	studies	have	to	deal	with	challenges	such	bias,	it	may	be	the	case	that	a	particular	local	subfield,	due	to	its	specific	nature	and	whatever	social																																																									7	It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	some	problems	with	Ioannidis’s	(2005a,	2005b)	methodology,	as	identified	in	Ruhmkorff	(2014,	419-421),	but	they	do	not	seem	to	be	problematic	enough	to	render	the	PMI-M	not	cogent.	
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norms	are	in	place	for	collecting	and	disseminative	evidence,	is	especially	challenged	in	a	way	that	can	justify	the	pessimistic	induction.	The	above	suggests	that	this	is	indeed	the	case	for	M-studies.	To	end,	Ruhmkorff	(2014)	argues	against	global	PMI	on	independent	grounds	(namely,	he	argues	that	the	PMI	commits	a	statistical	error	previously	unmentioned	in	the	literature	and	is	self-undermining),	and	but	he	also	argues	for	the	plausibility	of	a	local	PMI,	viz.,	M-PMI,	and	contends	that	there	are	clear	advantages	of	PMI-M	over	PMI.	What	I	wish	to	note	here	is	that	an	additional	advantage	of	PMI-M,	or	local	pessimistic	induction	generally	speaking,	is	that	whereas	global	PMI	dissolves	upon	a	material	analysis,	a	material	account	of	PMI-M	does	seem	viable.			6.	Conclusion		I	have	argued	that	historical	inductions	such	as	the	(global)	PMI	and	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives	dissolve	if	we	work	with	the	material	theory	of	induction.	The	reason	is	that	we	lack	the	material	postulates	needed	to	license	the	pessimistic	inference:	the	great	heterogeneity	of	case	studies	from	the	history	of	science	of	conceiving,	constructing,	and	discovering	(explanatory	and	predictively	successful)	theories,	along	with	abundant	variety	of	context	that	scientists	find	themselves	in	and	traits	that	they	exhibit,	make	it	unlikely	that	any	commonality	will	be	found	strong	enough	to	authorize	the	induction.	One	may	of	course	object:	so	much	worse	for	the	material	theory	of	induction!	This	is	a	fair	point,	but	there	is	a	more	general	moral	to	consider.	In	various	situations	one	may	be	able	to	appeal	to	the	notion	of	“induction”	without	much	being	at	stake,	but	in	the	context	of	historical	inductions	like	the	PMI	and	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives	“induction”	is	doing	a	lot	of	(philosophically)	heavy	lifting	and	so	the	situation	rightful	calls	for	scrutiny.	Such	scrutiny	has	led	to	the	various	discussed	criticism	that	are	presented	in	the	context	of	more	traditional,	non-material	theories	of	induction.	Accordingly,	it	seems	appropriate	to	show	that—even	if	we	assume	randomly	sampled	historical	evidence	from	the	correct	period	of	history	and	with	the	proper	unit	of	analysis	that	is	not	biased	or	cherry-picked,	with	no	statistical	error,	etc.—historical	inductions	do	not	fare	well	on	the	material	side	of	things.	I	leave	objections	to	the	effect	that	one	ought	to	construe	the	PMI	as	a	deductive	argument,	or	through	a	different	framework	for	induction,	e.g.,	via	hypothetical	or	probabilistic	induction,	for	future	work.		 References		Chakravartty,	A.	2008.	“What	You	Don’t	Know	Can’t	Hurt	You:	Realism	and	the	Unconceived.”	Philosophical	Studies	137:	149–158.	Crombie,	A.	C.,	1995.	Styles	of	Scientific	Thinking	in	the	European	Tradition,	3	vols.	London:	Duckworth.	Devitt,	M.	2011.	“Are	Unconceived	Alternatives	a	Problem	for	Scientific	Realism?”	
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